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Abstract 
This paper shows that, under certain reasonable conditions, if the investigation of the 
behavior of a physical system is difficult, no scientific change can make it significantly 
easier. This impossibility result implies that complexity is then a necessary feature of 
models which truly represent the target system and of all models which are rich enough to 
catch its behavior and therefore that it is an inevitable element of any possible science in 
which this behavior is accounted for. I finally argue that complexity can then be seen as 
representing an intrinsic feature of the system itself. 
 
 
1. Introduction. The purpose of this paper is to show that, under certain reasonable 
conditions, if the investigation of the behavior of a physical system is difficult, no 
scientific change can make it significantly easier. This can be seen as some sort of 
impossibility result that says that some epistemic situation (in which investigating a system 
could be difficult for some agents and easy for others) cannot be met. It thereby shows that 
complexity is necessarily a feature of the model(s) (whatever it (they) turn(s) out to be) 
that truly represent(s) the target system, and of all models that are rich enough to catch its 
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behavior. The complexity of the model can then be seen as representing an intrinsic 
characteristic of the system itself.  
Though the idea supporting the claim is quite straightforward, it needs to be spelled out 
with great care since the validity of the argument hinges on its details. I first sketch this 
general idea in section 2 and present the thrust of the argument. Sections 3-5 are then 
devoted to the discussion of the steps and scope of the argument. I argue in particular that, 
in the described situations, complexity can be claimed to be an inevitable feature of any 
(mathematically possible) investigation of the corresponding systems. 
 
2. Statement of the Problem and Sketch of the Argument. Progresses in mathematics or 
physics often make easier scientific tasks that were difficult, if not impossible, to carry out. 
For example, to decide whether a proposition of propositional logic is a tautology, one may 
laboriously enumerate all the 2k possible cases; but once the tree method is known, things 
become much easier. Such progresses may originate both in mathematical findings and in 
advances in the empirical sciences such as the development of new modeling schemes. The 
invention of the boundary layer by Prandtl seems to illustrate this latter case. Navier-
Stokes equations were derived in the mid-19th century but, because of their elliptic 
behavior, solving them was not possible for most practical problems like calculating the lift 
and drag on the first airplanes. By contrast, equations for the boundary layer were found to 
have parabolic behavior. This afforded significant analytical and computational 
simplification and the calculation of aerodynamic drag became possible for various 
situations. In such cases, the difficulty initially met by scientists is epistemic in the sense 
that it results from some lack of knowledge: Prandtl’s invention showed that the 
investigation was apparently complex but not intrinsically so. 
   Is complexity always epistemic – and can we always entertain the hope that it may be 
swept away by scientific progress? Conversely, if complexity is not always epistemic, in 
which cases should it be seen as an objective feature of an investigation? People familiar 
with logic and computer science know that it can sometimes be proved that some 
mathematical tasks are genuinely difficult or impossible to carry out. The purpose of this 
paper is to make a riskier step by presenting cases in which physical systems can reliably 
be described as inherently complex. 
   Complexity is a property of mathematical models or problems2. Accordingly, 
establishing that some complexity properties intrinsically characterize some physical 
systems seems to require, at the least, showing that the corresponding models are true 
representations of these systems – and thereby solving the realism/anti-realism problem in 
such cases. A particularity (oddity?) of the argument to follow is that no such thing is in 
fact needed: the complexity of the models will be shown to characterize systems faithfully 
even if these models are false. 
   To make things clearer from the start, I shall now present a short version of the 
argument. Here are the assumptions. One wants to investigate the target behavior B(Si) of 
systems Si, that is, of some set of systems of a common physical type S (e.g. Ising-like 	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system) in different configurations (e.g. the numbers of spins, geometry and external fields 
may vary). A general model M (like “the” Ising model) yields the family of particular 
models Mi which is empirically adequate3 regarding behavior B(Si). Finally, solving 
models Mi corresponds to a mathematical problem Π having irreducible computational 
complexity K. Let us now make the hypothesis that there exists another family of models 
Mi* which is also empirically adequate regarding behavior Bi and corresponds to a simple 
mathematical problem Π*.The claim is that this latter hypothesis implies a contradiction. 
Indeed, if Π* is simple, it should be possible, when trying to solve models Mi, to solve the 
corresponding easy models Mi* instead. It then becomes possible to solve problem Π 
easily, which, by assumption, is impossible. Therefore, if there is another empirically 
adequate family of models Mi* for B(Si), then the corresponding mathematical problem 
cannot be significantly simpler than Π. 
   Overall, the argument involves the main following claims: 
(1) the investigation of the behavior of physical systems can be described as computational 
problems (in the computer science sense); 
(2) such computational problems can be irreducibly complex; 
(3) if a computational problem corresponding to the solution of a family of empirically 
adequate models is complex, then any other such family corresponds to an equally 
complex computational problem.  
 
I provide in section 2 evidence for claims (1) and (2) and discuss claim (3), which is the 
potentially controversial core of the philosophical argument, in section 3. 
 
2. Physical Investigations and Complex Computational Problems. In this section I 
argue that investigations about physical systems can sometimes be adequately described by 
means of irreducibly complex computational problems. A computational problem is an 
infinite collection of tasks of a common type such as “Given two numbers p and q, find the 
value of their sum p+q”. The instances of the problem are the specific tasks that are 
actually being carried out, e.g. “1+1”, “1+2”, “2+1”, etc. To theoretically study the 
behavior B(Si) of a system Si, scientists need to investigate the corresponding property 
P(Mi) of a model Mi standing for Si. Then, they tackle the following task Ti “Based on (a 
suitable description of) Mi, find (a description of) P(Mi)”. Since the physical parameters of 
S can indefinitely vary, the generic study of B(Si) corresponds to an infinite number of 
tasks Ti of a common type and therefore to a computational problem. For example, generic 
physical investigations like “given a Ising system composed of p×q×r spins, calculate its 
equilibrium properties” or “given the description of a classical gas of n particles at time t0, 
find its state at time t0+t ” correspond to computational problems. 
The next step requires showing that some computational problems having a physical 	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interpretation are intrinsically complex. Fortunately, computer scientists and physicists 
complete themselves this step by applying computational complexity theory (hereafter 
CCT) to physical problems. A problem is regarded as inherently difficult if any algorithm 
that solves its instances requires significant resources. CCT formalizes this intuition by 
robustly quantifying the resources needed to solve problems and by identifying a hierarchy 
of robust complexity classes (like NC, P, NP, EXP, etc.). For example, a decision problem 
is NP-complete if its solutions can be verified in polynomial time (it belongs to NP) and 
any problem in NP reduces to it in polynomial time; a problem is P-complete if it can be 
solved in polynomial time by a Turing machine (it belongs to P) and every problem in P 
reduces to it through an appropriate reduction.  
A crucial notion in defining complete classes is that of reduction. A reduction is an 
algorithm transforming one problem into another one. For example, multiplication reduces 
to addition (2x3 = 2+2+2) and, if you know how to add, you know how to multiply. 
Reductions can also be used to show that the reduced problems are not more difficult than 
the reducing problem – provided that the cost of the reduction is negligible. Typically, to 
prove that a problem is NP-complete, polynomial reductions are used. Overall, if a 
problem is complete for a complexity class, unless this whole class collapses to some 
lower class (which, in the NP-complete case, is believed to be unlikely), no algorithm can 
be found to solve it significantly more quickly – whatever our scientific progresses. 
It is a fact that some (major) physical problems have been proven complete for some 
complexity classes. I shall present two. The Ising-model has played for decades a central 
role in the development of modern statistical physics (Baxter, 1982). Whereas Onsager 
solved the two-dimensional case in 1944, its three-dimension version resisted 
investigations for decades till Baharona (1982) proved that evaluating its partition function 
is a NP-hard problem. More simple physical problems, like lattice gas models, can be 
complete for lower complexity classes. The investigation of lattice gases started in the 
70ies as attempts to solve the Boltzmann equation for extremely simplified gazes of 
particles with discrete velocities (Hardy et al., 1973). Further inquiries proved that lattice 
gazes could be used to simulate Navier-Stokes equations (Frisch et al, 1986) and exhibit 
physical behavior. Lattice methods are currently being used in computational fluid 
dynamics for various applications such as the investigation of air flowing over vehicles.	  
They have been proven P-complete (Moore and Nordhal, 1997), which essentially means 
that sequential polynomial simulations are required to investigate them. 
We have reached so far the conclusion that, unless the complexity hierarchy partly 
collapses, the investigation of some physical models (e.g. Ising-like systems or billiard ball 
models) is irreducible complex (the degree of complexity being defined by the complexity 
class these models belong to). This conclusion calls for three remarks. 
First, the conclusion reached so far is not that, within some scientific practice, some 
physical models are actually investigated by solving some complex computational 
problems – otherwise, one could answer that these practices are complex ones and involve 
difficult tasks like computing Fourier transforms, inverting matrixes, finding optima, etc. 
but that maybe one is using sledgehammers to crack nuts and the difficulty may be 
bypassed by finding simpler techniques. But the claim is that the mathematical problem – 
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versus some practices solving it – is a complex one. Intuitively, saying that a problem is 
inherently complex means that solving it requires large resources, whatever the algorithm 
that is being used, which already involves quantifying over possible methods. For 
example, if P≠NP, no algorithm can solve a NP-complete problem in polynomial time. 
Further, any problem of a low class of complexity can be solved via a complete problem of 
a high class of complexity, since low complexity classes are included in higher complexity 
classes. For example, deciding whether a number is even can be performed by reducing 
this problem to 3-SAT (a NP-complete problem) and solving instances of 3-SAT. But 
evenness is a simple problem and the complexity of 3-SAT does not lie in the set of 
instances that can be used to solve instances of evenness. By contrast, the results described 
above indicate that solving the Ising-model is NP-complete, which means that no 
polynomial algorithm can solve all its instances. 
Second, when saying that some physical model has such or such complexity, I mean that 
all the instances of this model have a physical interpretation, which is the case for the Ising 
model and lattice gazes. If it were not so, the complexity of the computational problem 
may sometimes lie in a set of instances having no physical interpretation and then it would 
apparently but unduly characterize the physical problem. 
It may however be rightly objected that using a complex model to study the behavior of a 
system does not imply that no simpler model can be used for the same purposes nor that 
complexity characterizes the system itself. Therefore, the argument still falls short of 
proving the claim that the complexity of the model faithfully represents some property of 
the system. Accordingly, to substantiate the realist claim, there is the need for an additional 
semantic assumption about the felicitousness of the representational relation between the 
models Mi and the target systems so that the features of the mathematical models be 
“tacked” to the physical systems. As we shall now see, the sweet aspect of the argument is 
that truth is by no means required to complete this step and empirical adequacy, a notion 
usually considered as innocuous and deceptive by realists, is sufficient to do the job. 
 
3. The Core of the Argument. Let us now discuss the core of the argument. To put 
things briefly, it is assumed that an irreducibly model is used to study a system, that this 
model is empirically adequate and then it is shown by a reductio ad absurdum that it is not 
possible that another empirically adequate (possibly true!) and simple family of models 
does the same work.  
   Notations are as above. Pi (resp. Pi*) is the property of model Mi (resp. Mi*) that stands 
for behavior Bi and instances of problems Π (resp. Π*) are questions about these 
properties. 
 
Assumptions regarding our epistemic situation: 
 
- H1. Possibility of our practice. Target behavior Bi is in practice observable and models Mi 
can be in practice described (simplicity of modeling) and, when studying Bi, their content 
(once identified, see H3) can be meaningfully (simplicity of physical content description) 
ascribed to their target systems (simplicity of reference). 
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- H2. Semantic assumption. Family of models Mi is empirically adequate for behavior Bi. 
- H3. Mathematical complexity assumption. Computational problem Π has irreducible 
complexity K. 
 
Assumptions about the existence of another possible epistemic situation: 
 
- H4. Semantic assumption. Family of models Mi* is empirically adequate for behavior Bi. 
- H5. Mathematical complexity assumption. Computational problem Π* has complexity 
K* and K* is significantly lower than K in the CCT sense (e.g. Π* belongs to P and Π to 
NP). 
 
   H1 guarantees that we can easily ascribe the studied appearances to the target system and 
that the complex models we are using to investigate them are not ad hoc unduly intricate 
ways to investigate and refer to systems Si. H2 says that these models are empirically 
successful: property Pi catches behavior Bi, that is, Mi has an empirical substructure that is 
isomorphic to appearance Bi even if the underlying theoretical description is false. H3 adds 
that these models correspond to an irreducible class of complexity (in the CCT sense). H4 
says that another modeling practice is possible, which is not controversial, since any family 
of models isomorphic to models Mi will do. Strictly speaking, Px and Px* need not be the 
same properties since they catch target behavior Bi up to isomorphism (e.g. models Mi and 
Mi* may correspond to different reference frames). H4 and H5 jointly say that there exists 
another empirically adequate family of models that is in addition simpler to solve (in the 
CCT sense).  
   Here is now the reductio ad absurdum. Because of the empirical adequacy of the families 
of models Mi and Mj* for behavior Bi, questions about Mi (regarding Pi) have the same 
answers as those about the model Mj* (regarding Pj*) that represent the same systems – up 
to isomorphism. It is then tempting to use the instances of problem Π* to solve the 
instances of problem Π quickly. For any instance i of Π, one then needs to solve the 
associate instance j of Π*, that is, to solve model Mj* instead of model Mi. All it takes is to 
be able to identify for each Mi the corresponding Mj, or, in computational terms, to find a 
matching procedure that, given the description of Mi, translates it into the description of 
Mj* and thereby reduces problem Π to problem Π*. Since Pi and Pj* represent the same 
behavior Bi up to isomorphism, if Pj* is to be used to solve instances of Π, there may 
sometimes be the need to translate back the description of Pj* into the description of Pi. 
   Overall, the indirect way to solve models Mi (and problem Π) is composed of three steps, 
the matching procedure, the solution of models Mj* and, if necessary, the final return 
translation of the result. Here is now the catch. Since Π has irreducible complexity K and 
complexity cannot vanish in the air, one of these steps at least must also have complexity 
K. In brief, the original complexity constraint in the models that are actually being used has 
the following consequence: 
(a) Either, other empirically adequate models Mj* have the same complexity K; 
(b) Or their complexity is lower than K but matching models Mi with models Mj* 
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(if this is possible) has complexity K (e.g. if the original problem Π is NP-complete (resp. 
P-complete), then the translation procedure must be at least as costly, since Π* problem is 
comparatively easy). 
(c) Or models Mj* and the matching procedure have complexity lower than K but 
translating back the description of Pj* into the description of Pi has complexity K – though 
the two statements say the same thing, up to isomorphism. 
   Since we are investigating the possibility of the existence of a simple and empirically 
adequate family of models Mj*, we need to analyze whether situations (b) or (c) are 
possible.  
   Let us first discuss case (b). The situation is the following. The two families of well-
defined structures Mi and Mj* model the same family of systems and account for the same 
phenomena. Indeed, such correspondences between families of representations do exist in 
scientific practice, for example descriptions in Newtonian mechanics and Lagrangian 
mechanics, or descriptions in different reference frames, or standard representations and 
their Fourier transforms. The specificity of the situation is that one family of representation 
is (by assumption) intrinsically complex and the other simple. (Please note that when one 
makes a Fourier transform to make a calculation easier, one thereby proves that the 
original problem was not intrinsically difficult since you could transform it in a simpler 
problem). Finally, the investigated assumption is that matching the former to the latter is as 
difficult as solving the former, or even impossible: Is that latter assumption plausible? 
   Suppose that the simple family Mj* of models is in practice usable for modeling 
purposes, that is, that it is easily possible to match a non-theoretical characterization of 
system Si to the corresponding model (simplicity of modeling assumption). Then, it seems 
that one can always find a matching procedure between the two families of models: 
starting from models Mi, come back to its pre-theoretical identifying description (simplicity 
of reference, see hypothesis H1) and then remodel the system within the modeling 
framework of models Mj*. Going through the shared pre-theoretical description is a way to 
establish some translation between the two types of description. Now suppose that it is 
possible to faithfully describe this translation procedure algorithmically. Then there is a 
contradiction because the procedure is algorithmic and simple whereas it was supposed to 
have irreducible complexity K. 
   The other option is to suppose that the translation procedure, which can be cognitively 
carried out by modelers, is some mental operation that is irreducibly not algorithmic in the 
way it is carried out (even if it de facto computes the matching between models Mi and 
models Mj*). Then, we are compelled to accept that some mental modeling operation can, 
by some magic, quickly solve (all possible instances of) a complex (P-complete, NP-
complete, etc.) problem. As far as I know, there is no serious evidence in favor of this 
general possibility. 
   Overall, this means that if the complexity really lies in the matching procedure between 
families Mi and Mj, then there does exist simple models Mj but the modeling procedure to 
identify them must be as difficult as solving a problem with complexity K – for example 
solving a NP-complete problem if we are in the Ising case. Such a family of easy models 
then floats in the mathematical realm out of our modeling reach – and it can hardly 
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correspond to some possible-in-practice science.  
   It is worth insisting here: the modeling task does not lie in the invention of a new type of 
model. We can assume that models Mj are of a known type; what is here supposed to be 
difficult is the standardized application of this model type to physical situations of a 
known type, that is, finding particular versions of a general model that is known to 
correctly represent some type of situation. For example, the modeling task is not to invent 
the Ising model but to find the particular versions of the Ising model for particular systems 
of a common type (e.g. ferromagnetic systems having this or that geometry and number of 
atoms) of which we already know that the Ising-model is a good representation.  
   While the situation just described is implausible, I unfortunately have no clean, simple 
and final argument showing that it is logically, mathematically, or physically impossible. I 
even suspect that it is possible to cook up weird logical ad hoc constructs, possibly based 
on some costly transformations of the original problem Π, which make this situation 
possible. Typically, one may build into the modeling procedure the difficult steps of the 
solution of Mi and end up with some string of symbols computationally close to the 
solution of Mi; one may then claim that these strings are models Mj* and the trick is 
played. One may however doubt that the trick is acceptable, since all the complexity has 
been in practice transferred in the description of the family of models. Indeed, computer 
scientists do not seem to accept such descriptive procedures. Papadimitriou (a prominent 
computer scientist) notes: “There is a wide range of acceptable representations of integers, 
finite sets, graphs, and other such elementary objects. They may differ a lot in form and 
succinctness. However, all acceptable encodings are related polynomially. <…> In the 
course of this book, when we discuss a Turing machine that solves a particular 
computational problem, we shall always assume that a reasonably succinct input 
representation <…> is used” (1994, 26).  
   As philosophers of science, we may also add the acceptability constraint that the 
description of models Mj* should be made in a language that is suitable not only for 
investigating systems Si but also other classes of systems – as can be expected from a 
language a) that is used within some general scientific theoretical practice which goes 
beyond the particular study of the systems the complexity of which is being discussed and 
b) that is appropriate to describe natural kind predicates.  
   Overall, and even in the absence of a formal proof, it seems safe to conclude that the 
matching procedure between family of models Mj and Mj, if these models are to be given 
acceptable descriptions, can hardly have complexity K – especially if we are discussing 
models that have supra-polynomial complexity, like the Ising model (cases involving 
polynomial complexity are in a sense more difficult to treat because “acceptable” 
encodings are usually polynomially related). 
   There now remains the possibility that the complexity might lie in the translation 
between the descriptions of Pi and Pj* (case c above) but a critical discussion can be made 
along the same lines as above. Indeed, since models Mi, Mj* and the appearance say the 
same thing, up to isomorphism, the translation between the description of Pj* and Pi can go 
through the description of appearances. Then we would have a case of an easy family of 
models having some acceptable description (since the complexity is no longer supposed to 
	   9	  
lie in the modeling procedure) but determining what the solution Pj* means about the 
isomorphic appearances it represents would be a complex problem. For similar reasons as 
above, this possibility also appears implausible and unacceptable. 
Let us wrap up. Situations (b) and (c) describe would-be situation in which there 
are two different ways of modeling, one tractable, the other not, but there is something like 
a computational gap between i) these two possible practices, either in terms of identifying 
the easy models or of translating their solutions; ii) between non theoretical descriptions of 
the target systems (and their appearances) and the description of the easy models (or of 
their solutions) – and of course, the more intrinsically complex the original problem, the 
larger this gap must be. The argument above shows that such situations are extremely 
implausible or “non acceptable”. The converse conclusion is that in such cases, it is 
extremely plausible that any acceptable empirically adequate family of models (including 
the true models) have the same complexity K as the models we are actually using. 
 
4. Discussion. I now want to clarify a few points about the content, validity and scope of 
the argument. 
   i) Strictly speaking, complexity characterizes computational problems (and models), so it 
cannot be directly and meaningfully ascribed to a physical system. The precise claim is 
that, in the discussed cases, all satisfactory representations of a system cannot but have this 
complexity property – which is a high-order property, since it describes a common feature 
of all possible algorithms that solve some models. 
   ii) It can however be claimed that the corresponding systems have been characterized 
intrinsically. Indeed, not only is the complexity property a feature of their true 
representation, it also characterizes all the representations that can be used to investigate 
the target behavior. This second stronger statement secures the intrinsicalness claim since 
it does not make it relative to any particular representation and shows that it is an essential 
feature of any possible investigation of the system (versus a somewhat accidental and 
neutral feature of the system or its representation). Indeed, if using the true representation 
of the system to investigate its behavior was difficult but the difficulty could be 
sidestepped by using proxy representations, complexity would be a true but shallow, 
without epistemic effect and somewhat contingent feature of the system. By contrast, the 
claim is that its nature is such that it is intrinsically difficult to investigate it, whatever the 
nature and “degree of truth” of the representation.  
   iii) The claim made is immune to progresses in computer or physics. Typically, if a 
system is said to be inherently complex, the advent of quantum computers will not make it 
theoretically easier – even if, for practical purposes, solving it may be much faster. Going 
from Marathons to Athens by car is quicker than running all the way but it does not make 
the distance shorter. In the same way, quantum computers may remove computational 
constraints for scientists but it will change neither the complexity hierarchy nor the interest 
for refining low complexity classes and seeing which models and problems belong to them.  
   iv) In the argument, I did not have to specify whether the would-be families of 
empirically adequate and simple models were to be derived from the same theory or result 
from some more substantial theoretical change. Therefore, the result describes the limits of 
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the progresses possibly generated both by findings in modeling and theoretical revolutions.  
   v) I did not have to root my realist claims about complexity in the supposed truth of some 
aspects of some representations. Thus, whereas most discussions of realist claims need to 
bring answers to anti-realist arguments (see for example Psillos, 1999), the present 
argument is noncommittal about but compatible with the validity of anti-realist arguments, 
like those in terms of pessimist induction, under-determination or skepticism about 
inference to the best explanation. Therefore, anti-realists may also have to bite the bullet 
and be realist about the complexity of, say, Ising-like systems. But conversely, as far as I 
can see, the argument is also noncommittal about existing realist arguments regarding 
scientific representations.  
   vi) Since irreducible complexity cannot vanish mysteriously, anyone willing to defeat the 
argument need to explain where the complexity of the original models has gone and why 
no translation between models doing the same work is possible; if this ever happen, we 
will definitely learn something valuable about possible sciences. 
   vii) I have however claimed that if such simple families do exist, they can hardly be part 
of an actual tractable scientific practice. Accordingly, even if the reader refuses to buy the 
realist claim, she may still have to buy the inevitabilist claim about what usable 
representations of such systems must be like in any possible-in-practice science. 
 
5. Conclusion Fluid dynamics problems tackled by Prandtl were difficult but boundary 
layer models made them tractable. If the above argument is valid, no such progress is to be 
expected when the family of models that represent some system is both empirically 
successful and corresponds to an intrinsically intractable problem. In such cases, 
complexity is presumably an unavoidable property of all its acceptable representations and 
therefore faithfully reflects an intrinsic and essential property of the system. 
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